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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from the Report and Order dated July 21, 2000 issued by the Public
Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") in Docket No. 98-2216-01.l DI 198.
Appellant WWC Holding Co., Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Western Wireless
Corporation (collectively "Western Wireless") timely filed a Request for Reconsideration
and Rehearing on August 10, 2000. DI 210. The Commission took no action on Western
Wireless' Request for Reconsideration and Rehearing. In accordance with Utah Code
Ann. § 54-7-15, Western Wireless1 Request for Reconsideration and Rehearing was
deemed denied on August 30, 2000. Western Wireless timely filed its Petition for Writ
of Review on October 3, 2000. DI 215. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear
Western Wireless1 appeal of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(i).

1

References to the Docket Index will be cited as "DI , p. ." The Commission's
Order is reproduced in Appellant's Addendum beginning at ADD-1.
1261574v2
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Commission erred by finding there would be no benefits associated
with designating Western Wireless as an eligible telecommunications carrier
("ETC") in accordance with 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(l)-(2). The Court must review
this finding to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence in the
record (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)) and whether it is arbitrary and
capricious (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)). This issue was preserved
when Western Wireless requested reconsideration of this Commission finding. DI
210, pp. 3-6.

2.

Whether the Commission erred by concluding that designating Western Wireless
as a competitive ETC in rural areas might increase the size of the State Fund and
therefore is contrary to the public interest as contemplated by 47 U.S.C. §
214(e)(2). This conclusion is an error of law reviewed de novo by the Court. MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 840 P.2d 765 (Utah 1992).
This issue was preserved when Western Wireless requested reconsideration of this
Commission finding. DI 210, pp. 6-13.

3.

Whether the Commission erred in limiting WWC's reimbursement from the State
Fund for only those service offerings priced at or below the rate charged by the
incumbent carrier. This is an error of law reviewed de novo by the Court. MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 840 P.2d 765 (Utah 1992).
This issue was preserved when WWC requested reconsideration of this
Commission finding. DI210, pp. 13-18.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
47 U.S.C. § 214(e) (ADD-21 to ADD-22).
47 U.S.C. § 253 (ADD-23 to ADD-24).
47 U.S.C. § 254 (ADD-25 to ADD-30).
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3) (ADD-31 to ADD-32).
Utah Code Ann. Ch. 54-8b (ADD-33 to ADD-50).
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (ADD-51 to ADD-52).
Utah Admin. Code Ch. R746-360 (ADD-53 to ADD-62).
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DEFINED TERMS
Act: The Federal Communications Act of 1934,
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 etseq.

as

amended

by

the

CMRS: commercial mobile radio service.
Commission: the Public Service Commission of Utah.
DPU: Division of Public Utilities.
ETC: eligible telecommunications carrier.
FCC: Federal Communications Commission.
ILEC: incumbent local exchange carrier.
Order: In the Matter of the Petition of WWC Holding Co., Inc., for Designation as an
Eligible Telecommunications Carrier, Utah Public Service Commission Docket No. 982216-01, Report and Order (July 21, 2000).
State Fund: The Utah Universal Service Public Telecommunications Service Support
Fund established by the Commission as required by Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-15.
Universal Service Order: In the Matter of Federal-State Board on Universal Service,
Report and Order, CC Docket No. 96-45, 12 FCC Red 88776 (rel. May 8, 1997), as
corrected by Federal-State Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45 Erratum,
FCC 97-157 (rel. June 4, 1997), aff d in part, rev?d in part, remanded in part sub, nom.
Texas Office of Pub. UtiL Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999).
URTA: Utah Rural Telephone Association.
Western Wireless: Appellant WWC Holding Co., Inc.
Wyoming Order: In the Matter of Western Wireless Corporation Petition for Designation
as an Eligible Telecommunications Carrier in the State of Wyoming, CC Docket No. 9645, Memorandum Opinion and Order, DA 00-2896 (rel. Dec. 26, 2000).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of Case and Disposition By Commission

Western Wireless filed a Petition with the Commission seeking designation as an
eligible telecommunications carrier ("ETC") for the purpose of receiving universal
service support from the federal and state universal service funds. DI 1, pp. 1-2. The
Commission held a hearing on the Petition, and issued its Report and Order ("Order")
granting Western Wireless1 Petition subject to conditions in some geographic areas, and
denying Western Wireless1 Petition in other geographic areas. DI 198, p. 16. Western
Wireless filed a request for rehearing. DI 210. This request was not acted on by the
Commission and thus was deemed denied. This appeal followed.
B.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues

Western Wireless is licensed by the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") to provide commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS"), e.g., cellular service, in
certain areas of Utah. DI 223, p. 4. In accordance with federal and state law, Western
Wireless filed a Petition with the Commission dated August 31, 1998, seeking
designation as an ETC in a number of areas within its existing service area in Utah. DI 1.
As an ETC, Western Wireless would be authorized to receive federal and state "universal
service" support that is available to carriers providing basic local telephone service.
"Universal service" support allows carriers to provide basic local telephone service at an
affordable rate to low income consumers and to consumers in rural areas where it is
expensive to provide telephone service. Alenco Communications Inc. v. F.C.C., 201 F.3d
608, 614-15 (5th Cir. 2000); Utah Admin. Code § R746-360-1.

1261574v2
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Western Wireless1 Petition was opposed by the monopoly incumbent local
exchange carriers ("ILECs") located in Western Wireless1 requested designated service
areas. Each of these ILECs was previously granted ETC status by the Commission and is
currently the only designated ETC in its respective service area. DI 221, p. 406. The
ILECs include Qwest Communications (formerly U S WEST), and five "rural telephone
companies." These rural telephone companies are members of the Utah Rural Telephone
Association (f,URTA,f).

DI 198, p. 5.

Rural telephone companies are generally

independent companies located in rural areas.
A hearing on Western Wireless* Petition was held from November 30 through
December 1, 1999. DI 220-222. Western Wireless offered testimony demonstrating it
meets the requirements to be an ETC under federal and state law. DI 223, pp. 8-13, 1719, 23. Western Wireless also offered evidence that it would be in the public interest to
designate Western Wireless as an ETC in areas served by rural telephone companies,
because a public interest finding is required to designate an additional ETC in an area
served by a rural telephone company. DI 223, pp. 21-23. The evidence showed that as
an ETC Western Wireless would provide service to some consumers who currently have
no access to basic local telephone service, and to consumers not adequately served by the
serving ILEC. DI 222, pp. 632-33. In addition, Western Wireless would make new and
innovative competitive services available to consumers currently served only by an ILEC.
DI 223, p. 15-16; DI 220, p. 13. The evidence also demonstrated other public interest
benefits of designating Western Wireless as an ETC, including a mobility component that
would be attractive to consumers in rural areas, and a local calling area larger than that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

offered by the ILECs. DI 223, p. 13-14; DI 220, p. 11. Western Wireless also
established that the U.S. Congress created universal service funds to promote and
accommodate competition in the provision of basic local telephone service. DI 220, p.
10. Because policy makers recognized the well-established benefits of competitive
markets, they have required that federal and state universal service support be made
available to competitive providers serving low income and high-cost consumers. Alenco
Communications, 201 F.3d 608, 614-15. Because each of the URTA companies is
currently the only ETC in its respective service area, the public interest would be served
by bringing competition to these areas. DI 221, p. 406.
Based on the evidence, the Commission concluded Western Wireless satisfied all
of the state and federal requirements to be an ETC, and thus designated Western Wireless
as an ETC in the requested exchanges served by Qwest (not a rural telephone company).
DI 198, p. 16. The Commission, however, denied Western Wireless1 Petition in the areas
served by rural telephone companies because it concluded that ETC designation was not
in the public interest. DI 198, p. 13. The rationale for the Commission's decision was
only that the designation of Western Wireless "might" increase the size of the state
universal service fund ("State Fund"). DI 198, p. 13. As a result of such a possibility, the
Commission concluded Western Wireless1 designation would not be in the public interest.
DI 198, p. 13. The Commission stated the State Fund should be available only to the
rural telephone companies, thereby ensuring their continued monopoly status. DI 198,
pp. 12-13. The Commission speculated that if the rural telephone companies face
competition they might lose revenue and seek more money from the State Fund. DI 198,
1261574v2
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pp. 12-13. The impact of competition on the size of the State Fund based on the funding
rules now in place was not addressed at the hearing, however, because the Commission
adopted the funding rules for the State Fund between the time of the evidentiary hearing
and the date of the Commission's Order. The Commission failed to make affirmative
findings of benefits to consumers that would result from the designation of Western
Wireless as an ETC. DI 198, p. 13.
In granting federal and state ETC status to Western Wireless in the Qwest
exchanges, the Commission further imposed a limit on the price of Western Wireless'
universal service offerings.

DI 198, p. 14. The Commission determined Western

Wireless' service offerings would be eligible for support from the State Fund only if
priced at or below the rate charged by Qwest. DI 198, p. 14.

n£ici)<„'»
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Commission erred when it found there would be no benefits associated with

designating Western Wireless as an ETC in rural telephone company areas.

The

Commission concluded there would be a significant public benefit to designation if
Western Wireless would serve consumers who currently are unable to obtain local
telephone service, but contrary to the evidence, found Western Wireless1 designation
would not lead to that benefit. This finding is not supported by substantial evidence in
the record as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). The Commission also
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b16(4)(h)(iv) in its unexplained disregard of uncontradicted evidence of the other public
interest benefits that would be realized by designating Western Wireless as an additional
ETC. Such benefits include the general benefits of competition in the provision of basic
local telephone service, which both the U.S. Congress ("Congress") and the Utah
Legislature ("Legislature") have already determined must be a part of universal service
programs. The Commission also failed to recognize consumer benefits associated with
the ability to choose a competitive local service offering that includes a mobility
component and a local calling area larger than the incumbents1.

Western Wireless

requests the Court to direct the Commission to enter an order recognizing these public
interest benefits that would result from designating Western Wireless as an additional
ETC in rural telephone company areas.

1261574v2
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2.

The Commission erred by concluding that designating Western Wireless as a

competitive ETC in rural telephone company areas might increase the size of the State
Fund and therefore is contrary to the public interest as contemplated by 47 U.S.C. §
214(e)(2). In drawing this conclusion the Commission erroneously interpreted Utah
Code Ann. Ch. 54-8b, and 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(l)-(2), which require universal service
support to be available to qualifying competitive carriers, not reserved solely for
incumbent providers. The Commission's interpretation that the "public interest" is served
by universal service programs that fund only the incumbent providers, thereby ensuring
their monopoly status over local telephone service to the detriment of the public, is an
error of law in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d). The effect of the
Commission's Order is to thwart federally-mandated universal service requirements in
violation of 47 U.S.C. §§ 253(a), 253(b), and 254(f), and therefore is unconstitutional as
applied and beyond the Commission's jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b16(4)(a)-(b).

Western Wireless requests that the Court determine the Commission

erroneously applied the public interest standard by concluding that the possibility the
State Fund might increase due to competition is contrary to the public interest. Western
Wireless further requests the Court find that because Western Wireless' designation will
result in numerous benefits to consumers, Western Wireless' designation as an ETC is in
the public interest in the areas served by URTA companies. The Court should thus order
the Commission to designate Western Wireless as an ETC eligible for the receipt of state
and federal funding in the areas served by the URTA companies identified in Western
Wireless' Petition.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

The Commission erred in limiting Western Wireless1 reimbursement from the

State Fund for only those service offerings priced at or below the rate charged by the
incumbent carrier. Commission Rule R746-360-7(B) states that support from the State
Fund is available only for offerings priced at the Commission-determined "affordable
base rate." First, this requirement is preempted as to a CMRS provider, like Western
Wireless, because federal law preempts such state rate regulation. See 47 U.S.C. §
332(c)(3)(A).

Thus, the Commission's Order violates Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

16(4)(a)-(b). Second, even if this requirement could be legally applied to Western
Wireless, the Commission has not, pursuant to statute, established an "affordable base
rate." The Commission instead "presumed" the ILECs current rate is affordable, and
ordered the price of Western Wireless* offerings to be capped at those rates. By this
Order the Commission engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process and
failed to follow prescribed procedures in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(e).
Western Wireless requests the Court order that Commission Rule R746-360-7(B) does
not apply to Western Wireless, or in the alternative that the affordable base rate must be
established by the Commission in a rulemaking proceeding conducted in accordance with
the requirement of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.

1261574v2
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ARGUMENT
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Universal Service: Law and Regulation

Universal service - ensuring all Americans have access to affordable phone
service - has been a goal in this country since the FCC was created in 1934. Alenco, 201
F.3d at 615. To accomplish universal service goals, the FCC and state regulatory
commissions have historically provided for affordable telephone service to all individuals
through a combination of implicit and explicit subsidies available only to ILECs. In the
Matter of Federal-State Board on Universal Serv., Report and Order, CC Docket No. 9645, 12 FCC Red 88776, If 10 & n.15 (rel. May 8, 1997) ("Universal Service Order"), as
corrected by Federal-State Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45 Erratum,
FCC 97-157 (rel. June 4, 1997), aff d in part, revfd in part, remanded in part sub, nom.
Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. F.C.C., 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999). These subsidies
have benefited two types of consumers, those in "high cost" areas where it is expensive to
serve, and those with low incomes who otherwise might not be able to afford telephone
service. Until recently, there was not much impetus to change this universal service
support system because local telephone markets were maintained as monopolies.
In 1996, however, in recognition of the emerging competitive local
telecommunications market, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
which amended the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (collectively
"the Act"). The express purposes of the Act were to "promote competition and reduce
regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies." Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.

Because

competitive local markets would need a different universal service regime, Congress
directed the FCC to replace the existing patchwork of implicit subsidy mechanisms with
"specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and State mechanisms to preserve and
advance universal service." 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5); Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v.
F.C.C., 183 F.3d 393, 407 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Texas OPUC").
In response to this statutory mandate, the FCC adopted a series of orders in CC
Docket No. 96-45, beginning with its Universal Service Order adopted on May 7, 1997,
that established funding mechanisms and rules for states to follow in designating eligible
carriers. Consistent with the Act's directives, the FCC concluded, among other things,
that "universal service will be sustainable in a competitive environment; this means both
that the system of support must be competitively neutral and permanent, and that all
support must be targeted as well as portable among eligible telecommunications carriers."
Universal Service Order, 119 (emphasis added).
"Competitive neutrality" and "portability" of support are essential to ensuring the
twin goals of competition and universal service are realized. Competitive neutrality
means that "universal service support mechanisms and rules neither unfairly advantage
nor disadvantage one provider over another, and neither unfairly favor nor disfavor one
technology over another." Universal Service Order, f 47. The FCC concluded this
principle would promote emerging technologies that would provide competitive
alternatives in rural areas and thus benefit high cost consumers. Universal Service Order,
1261574v2
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Tf 50. By adopting the principle of competitive neutrality, the FCC sought to "foster the
development of competition and may benefit certain providers, including wireless, cable
and small businesses" that previously have been excluded as providers of universal
service. Universal Service Order, ^| 49.
"Portability" is the simple principle that universal service support follows the
customer. In other words, if a competitive ETC "wins" a customer from the ILEC, the
competitive ETC is entitled to the same support the ILEC would have received for
serving the customer. Universal Service Order, ^ 311. See 47 C.F.R. § 54.305 (2000).
The FCC concluded that portability would facilitate competition in rural areas, would
fairly reward the carrier that bears the economic cost of serving the customer, and would
require less efficient ILECs to become more efficient over time. Universal Service
Order,fflf286-89. These principles of competitive neutrality and portability are central to
the FCCs goal of accomplishing competition while preserving universal service.
Upon review of the FCC orders implementing the Act's universal service
provisions, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed the FCCs determination that
universal service rules must not only accommodate, but must promote, competition. In
Alenco Communications, Inc. v. FCC, the Fifth Circuit addressed various aspects of the
FCCs universal service rules and confirmed that competition and universal service are
twin goals of the Act:
The FCC must see to it that both universal service and local competition are
realized; one cannot be sacrificed in favor of the other. The Commission
therefore is responsible for making the changes necessary to its universal
service program to ensure that it survives in the new world of competition.
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Alenco, 201 F.3d at 615. To promote these dual goals, the Court upheld the FCCs
portability rule as a competitively neutral way of enticing entrants to serve in high-cost
areas:
[T]he program must treat all market participants equally - for example,
subsidies must be portable - so that the market, and not local or federal
government regulators, determines who shall compete for and deliver
services to customers. Again, this principle is made necessary not only by
the economic realities of competitive markets but also by statute. See 47
U.S.C. § 214(e)(1) (requiring that all "eligible telecommunications
carrier[s]... shall be eligible to receive universal service support").
Alenco, 201 F.3d at 616. Thus, the FCCs rules requiring universal service to be
accomplished through competition were not only upheld as reasonable, they were
mandated by the Act. Id. at 625.
B.

ETC Eligibility Criteria and ETC Designation

Under the FCC rules, universal service support is made available to both
incumbent and competitive carriers that serve: (1) consumers in high-cost, rural areas
where the cost of providing service exceeds an established affordable rate for basic
service; and (2) qualified low-income consumers who are eligible to pay reduced rates for
basic service.2 To be eligible to receive universal service support, however, a carrier
must first be designated as an ETC by a state commission. 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(1).

2

Low income universal service support is provided through the FCCs Lifeline and LinkUp programs, which allow qualified low-income consumers to pay reduced charges for
installation and monthly service once a consumer certifies to an ETC that the consumer
participates in at least one specified federal program. The ETC must then make the
discounts available to the customer and seek reimbursement from the federal funds. See
47 C.F.R. §§ 54.401 et seq. (2000).
1261574v2
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Section 214(e) of the Act and the FCCs rules set forth the eligibility criteria for a
state commission to apply in designating an ETC. An applicant must:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

be a common carrier as defined by federal law;
demonstrate an ability to offer certain "supported services" which have
been prescribed by the FCC in 47 C.F.R. § 54.101(a)(l)-(9);
undertake to advertise the availability of the services and charges using
media of general distribution; and
have a designated ETC service area.

47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(1). Further, before designating an additional ETC in an area served
by a rural telephone company,3 the state commission must find that the designation is in
the "public interest." 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2).
Although the Act does not identify the factors to be considered in the public
interest analysis, the FCC recently gave guidance as to how that public interest analysis is
to be applied. In the Matter of Western Wireless Corporation Petition for Designation as
an Eligible Telecommunications Carrier in the State of Wyoming, CC Docket No. 96-45,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, DA 00-2896 (rel. Dec. 26, 2000) ("Wyoming Order")
(finding that designating Western Wireless as an ETC in rural telephone company areas
is in the public interest).4 In 1998, Western Wireless filed a request for ETC designation

3

The definition of "rural telephone company" is contained in 47 U.S.C. § 153(37).
Essentially, a rural telephone company is any local exchange carrier which (1) does not
serve any incorporated place of more than 10,000 inhabitants, (2) provides telephone
exchange service to fewer than 50,000 access lines, (3) provides service to any local
exchange carrier "study area" with fewer than 100,000 access lines, or (4) has less than
15 percent of its access lines in communities of more than 50,000 on the date of the 1996
Act. There is no dispute that the URTA companies opposing Western Wireless1 Petition
are all rural telephone companies.
4

The Wyoming Order is reproduced in Appellant's Addendum beginning at ADD-73.
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in the state of Wyoming.

The Wyoming Commission dismissed the petition on

jurisdictional grounds, so Western Wireless refiled the petition with the FCC under 47
U.S.C. § 214(e)(6).5 Id Iflf 4-5. On December 26, 2000, the FCC issued its Wyoming
Order designating Western Wireless as an ETC in both non-rural and rural telephone
company areas. It therefore found Western Wireless1 designation served the public
interest. Id. If 1.
In conducting its public interest inquiry, the FCC identified the factors that should
be considered in such an analysis. The FCC first looked to whether Western Wireless1
designation would advance federal goals of competition, including increased customer
choice, new services, new technologies, and incentives for all carriers to provide services
at just, reasonable and affordable rates. Id. H 16-17.
Once this threshold showing of benefits was made, the FCC shifted the burden of
proof to opposing rural ILECs to show that consumers would be harmed by the
designation. Id. 118. Specifically, the FCC stated:
[W]e believe that Congress was concerned that consumers in areas served
by rural telephone companies continue to be adequately served should the
incumbent telephone company exercise its option to relinquish its ETC
designation under section 214(e)(4).

5

Section 214(e)(6) sets forth standards for designation by the FCC that are identical to
the standards for state commissions under Section 214(e)(l)-(2).
1261574v2
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Id. Tf 18.6 In other words, the FCC stated that the public interest test was intended to
prevent adverse impact to consumers that might result if an incumbent carrier were
driven out of business by the new competitor.
The FCC found no evidence on the record that ILECs would go out of business,
and found Western Wireless was capable of serving all consumers if that unlikely event
were to occur. Id. fflj 19-20. Having found benefits without adverse impact, the FCC
found the public interest was advanced by designating Western Wireless as an ETC in
rural telephone company areas in Wyoming. Id. ^ 22.
C.

The Role of a State Commission in Implementing Universal Service
Reforms

In 47 U.S.C. § 214(e), Congress delegated to state commissions the responsibility
to assist in the implementation of the new universal service program. Because state
commissions have traditionally overseen basic local telephone service, Congress directed
state commissions to take primary responsibility for designating ETCs, establishing ETC
service areas, and determining whether the public interest would be served by designating
an additional ETC in areas served by a rural telephone company. 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(1)(2).
When a state commission acts, however, it is implementing federal law and must
do so consistent with the Act and the FCCs regulations. The Act includes specific
limitations on state actions in matters governed by the Act. Section 253(a) of the Act
6

Section 214(e)(4) provides that in an area with multiple ETCs, any ETC can seek to
abrogate its ETC designation. The state Commission must allow that to happen, but can
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mandates that no state or local legal requirement "may prohibit or have the effect of
prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 253(a). Section 253(b) limits states to actions
that are competitively neutral, consistent with Section 254 of the Act, and necessary to
preserve and advance universal service. 47 U.S.C. § 253(b).
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has confirmed that the Act has preemptive
effect, and that states must follow the lawful directives of the FCC when implementing
their obligations under the Act. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted:
[T]he question in this case is not whether the Federal Government has taken
the regulation of local telecommunications away from the States. With
regard to the matters addressed by the 1996 Act, it unquestionably has.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.. 525 U.S. 366, 378, 119 S. Ct. 721, 730 n.6 (1999).
Based on this, the Court held that states are bound to follow FCC rules and guidelines in
carrying out the goals of this federal legislation. 525 U.S. at 378, 119 S. Ct. at 730.
Congress directed states to establish and implement state universal service funding
mechanisms to work in conjunction with the federal fund (47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5)), and
gave states that authority in the Act:
A state may adopt regulations to provide for additional definitions and
standards to preserve and advance universal service within that State only
to the extent that such regulations adopt additional specific, predictable, and
sufficient mechanisms to support such definitions or standards that do not
rely on or burden Federal universal service support mechanisms.

order remaining carrier(s) to build or buy facilities necessary to ensure all consumers will
continue to be served.
1261574v2
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47 U.S.C. § 254(f). This authority clearly requires that state universal service programs
must be consistent with the Act and not thwart Congress1 goals.
The FCC recently discussed circumstances in which a state universal service
program could be preempted as being at odds with the Act. In its KUSF Memorandum
and Order, the FCC addressed one part of the Kansas Universal Service Fund ("KUSF")
that was reserved to benefit only universal service providers that were also ILECs. In the
Matter of Western Wireless Corp. Petition for Preemption of Statutes and Rules
Regarding the Kansas Universal Serv. Fund, Memorandum Opinion and Order, File No.
CWD 98-90, FCC 00-309,If 11 (rel. Aug. 28, 2000) ("KUSF Memorandum and Orders.7
The FCC observed that a program that favored ILECs would give ILECs a competitive
advantage in the universal service market, and would likely prevent competition from
developing. Id If 8. The FCC cautioned that such state universal service mechanisms
would likely be viewed as "prohibiting such competitors

from providing

telecommunications service" in violation of Section 253(a) of the Act, would not be
"competitively neutral" as required by that Section, and could be preempted as
inconsistent with and contrary to important Congressional and FCC goals. Id. ^ 8, 11.
The FCC also expressed concern that such a program could be preempted as not
"consistent with Section 254" and not "necessary to preserve and advance universal
service" as required by Section 254(f). Id. n.37.

7

The KUSF Memorandum and Order is reproduced in Appellant's Addendum beginning
atADD-63.
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In accordance with the Congressional directive to establish state universal service
mechanisms, the Utah Legislature directed the Commission to establish a State Universal
Service Fund "consistent with the Federal Telecommunications Act." Utah Code Ann. §
54-8b-15(4)(c). The Legislature further directed that the:
Operation of the fund shall be nondiscriminatory and competitively and
technologically neutral in the collection and distribution of funds, neither
providing a competitive advantage for, nor imposing a competitive
disadvantage upon, any telecommunications provider operating in the state.
Id. § 54-8b-15(5) (emphasis added). The Legislature also required that the State Fund be
portable among qualifying universal service providers. Id. § 54-8b-15(8).
To meet this mandate the Commission created a State Fund and rules for the
distribution of state universal service support.

Utah Admin. Code Ch. R746-360.8

Although the funding rules have been subject to amendment, the current rules (which
were adopted subsequent to the hearing in this matter but before the Commission's Order)
promise the rural ILECs support sufficient to guarantee a statutory rate of return based on
the embedded costs of their networks, regardless of whether the ILECs succeed in
winning and retaining universal service customers. Utah Admin. Code § R746-3609(A)(1). A competitive carrier (if designated) would be entitled to the same per-line
support received by the ILEC, multiplied by the number of lines served, but is not
guaranteed any level of financial success. Id § R746-360-9(A)(2). In other words, the
current funding rules guarantee rural telephone companies a specific market outcome,
whether or not they win customers in a competitive market.

8

These rules are reproduced in Appellant's Addendum beginning at ADD-53.
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It is against this background of federal and state universal service regulation that
WWC challenges the Commission's Order.
II.

THE COMMISSION ERRED BY FAILING TO MAKE APPROPRIATE
FINDINGS AS TO THE BENEFITS TO UTAH CONSUMERS THAT WILL
RESULT FROM WESTERN WIRELESS' ETC DESIGNATION
Western Wireless1 first challenge to the Commission's Order is the Commission's

failure to make proper findings as to the benefits of designating WWC as an ETC in areas
served by rural telephone companies. The recognition of these benefits - which are
based on the undisputed record evidence - is essential to a fair determination of whether
Western Wireless1 designation as an additional ETC in the areas served by rural telephone
companies is in the public interest. Because the Commission did not make these
findings, and did not include these benefits in its public interest balancing test, the
Commission's public interest test is flawed and unsupportable.
A.

Burden of Proof

Western Wireless recognizes that it has the burden of proving that the
Commission's factual findings are not supported by the record, or are arbitrary and
capricious. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4). Only one of Western Wireless1 challenges
seeks to reverse a specific finding of fact, and the evidence clearly shows the record to be
directly contrary to this finding. Western Wireless1 other challenges relate to findings not
made by the Commission. Although the Commission purported to balance benefits of
designating Western Wireless as an ETC against harms that might occur, the Commission
failed to recognize certain benefits that were not challenged on the record.

The

Commission's failure to make these findings is unsupported by substantial evidence in the
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record (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)), and arbitrary and capricious (Id. § 63-46b16(4)(h)(iv)).
The use of the "arbitrary and capricious'1 standard to challenge the Commission's
unexplained failure to make findings supported by undisputed facts is consistent with
Utah law. In US WEST Communications v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 901 P.2d 270
(Utah 1995), US WEST sought a rate increase that reflected, among other things, certain
marketing expenses for services rendered by its affiliate. IdL at 273. The Commission
denied recovery of these expenses after concluding the services provided by US WEST
"may be duplicative" of services provided by another affiliate. IdL US WEST, however,
had offered testimony that there was no duplication, and this testimony was unchallenged
and unopposed on the record.

Id. at 274.

The Court found the Commission's

determination that the expenses might be duplicative was arbitrary and capricious and
subject to reversal due to "unexplained disregard of credible, uncontradicted evidence" to
the contrary. Id.
Western Wireless will show that the Commission disregarded credible,
unchallenged evidence of specific benefits that would result from designating Western
Wireless as an ETC, and as a result the Commission's public interest balancing test is
flawed. This is fully supported by the record evidence and consistent with the Court's
holding in US WEST Communications v, Public Service Commission.
B.

It is in the Public Interest to Bring Competition to Rural Consumers

The Commission erred in failing to recognize the undisputed benefits of bringing
competitive universal service offerings to consumers in rural telephone company service
1261574v2
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areas.

As explained above, "an important goal of the Act is to open local

telecommunications markets to competition. Designation of competitive ETCs promotes
competition and benefits consumers in rural and high-cost areas by increasing customer
choice, innovative services, and new technologies." Wyoming Order, ^j 17 (footnote
omitted). The Utah Legislature has also mandated that it is the policy of the state to:
(3)

encourage the development of competition as a means of providing
wider customer choices for public telecommunications services
throughout the state;

(8)

encourage new technologies and modify regulatory policy to allow
greater competition in the telecommunications industry;

(9)

enhance the general welfare and encourage the growth of the
economy of the State through increased competition in the
telecommunications industry.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-l.l (emphasis added). Because each of the URTA companies is
currently the only designated ETC in its respective service territory (DI 221, p. 406),
designation of Western Wireless as an additional ETC will bring competitive universal
offerings to areas where there are none.
DPU witness and economist Dr. George Compton proffered testimony recognizing
the national presumption that competition is in the public interest. DI 300, p. 3. DPU
witness Henningsen also affirmed that the DPU strongly supports bringing competition to
rural consumers. DI 222, p. 549. Dr. Compton testified that an increased level of
competition is presumed to be in the public interest because it leads to increased
consumer choice (DI 300, p. 11), and better service (DI 222, p. 626). He also testified
that these benefits are most substantial when a monopoly market is made competitive. DI
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222, p. 621. Western Wireless witness Mr. Blundell also testified as to the reasons why
competition is expected to benefit consumers, including increased consumer autonomy
(DI 220, p. 13) and increased investment (DI 220, p. 15). Qwest's witness also agreed
competition is generally in the public interest. DI 221, p. 255.
Despite the federal and state mandates recognizing the benefits of competition,
and testimony that the public interest is served by bringing competition to monopoly
areas, the Commission failed in any way to acknowledge these benefits in its public
interest analysis. DI 198, pp. 12-13. The fact that designating Western Wireless as an
ETC will bring competition in the provision of universal service to the areas now served
only by the URTA companies must be found to be a consideration that weighs in favor of
a public interest finding.
The Commission's failure to find a public interest benefit associated with bringing
competition to monopoly markets ignores federal and state law, and undisputed record
evidence. Accordingly, the Commission erred by failing to find the public interest would
be served by the introduction of universal service competition in the URTA areas
currently limited to monopoly service.
C.

The Public Interest is Served by Increased Subscribership in Utah

The Commission erred by finding Western Wireless would not provide universal
service to customers who currently do not have telephone service. The undisputed
evidence shows Western Wireless' designation would provide this benefit. The Court
should thus reverse the Commission's Order and enter a finding that designating Western
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Wireless as an ETC would serve the public interest because Western Wireless would
bring service to those currently without access to the network.
The Commission recognized the substantial benefit that would result if a new ETC
could provide universal service to some customers not currently served by an ILEC:
[T]he primary potential benefit of designating Western Wireless as a "rural"
ETC could have been that areas that are not currently being served by any
incumbent... could now be served by Western Wireless.
DI 198, p. 13. The Commission determined WWC would not serve these types of
consumers based on its requested service areas. DI 198, p. 13. The record, however, is
undisputed that there are still consumers today within Western Wireless1 requested
designated service areas who have not been connected to the ILEC network because of
the high cost of constructing new facilities. DPU witness Dr. Compton provided the only
record evidence on this point. He testified "there are large areas within the incumbents1
certificated territories where new service would not be immediately available, and where
the line extension costs are such as to make new service prohibiting expensive without a
substantial number of customers to spread the costs among." DI 300, p. 21. On the
witness stand, Dr. Compton confirmed that Western Wireless' current signal would allow
it to provide such unserved consumers a universal service offering:
Q.

The next goal is service in new and remote areas. Do you
understand that Western Wireless's application is limited to those
physical boundaries that are currently served by either US West or
one of the rural LECs?

A.

Right. Okay, the service area goes well beyond where [LECs]
actually have lines and equipment.
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Q.

And I'm trying to find out if you're talking about unserved
consumers within an assigned territories or unassigned territories?

A.

Both. But primarily unserved customers within the assigned
territory.

Q.

Okay. Why are they currently unserved?

A.

It's just too expensive to serve them.

Q.

Because of the income [sic] it's going to charge them to build out to
their house?

A.

Right.

Q.

That's going to be a big benefit to these consumers, is it not?

A,

Yes.

DI 222, pp. 632-33 (emphasis added). There is no evidence in the record that contradicts
this testimony of a public interest benefit associated with designating Western Wireless
as an ETC.
The Commission erred by confusing unserved consumers in an unassigned
territory with unserved consumers in an assigned territory.

DI 198, p. 13. An

"unassigned territory" is an area for which no ILEC has been granted a certificate, and for
which there is no designated ETC. In such a case, the Act allows a commission to
undertake a separate proceeding to determine the carrier best able to serve as an ETC. 47
U.S.C. § 214(e)(3). In its Order, the Commission properly noted that Western Wireless
was seeking designation only in areas which currently have an assigned ETC. DI 198, p.
13.

Because of this, the Commission erroneously determined Western Wireless

necessarily would not serve any currently unserved consumers. Id. As made clear by Dr.
Compton's unchallenged testimony, however, there currently are unserved consumers
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within assigned ILEC territories, who are within Western Wireless1 existing signal
coverage. DI 222, pp. 632-33. These customers do not have access to basic telephone
service, but will if Western Wireless is designated as an ETC as requested. Id.
It is therefore undisputed that Western Wireless will bring universal service
offerings to some consumers currently without access to the network. The Commission's
determination otherwise is not supported by substantial record evidence, and rejects
undisputed testimony of the DPU economist. The Court should correct this fact finding,
and should also determine that in conducting the public interest balancing test, the fact
that Western Wireless will serve some customers not currently connected to the network
weighs in favor of the public interest. This is consistent with the Commission's own
statement that this would be a benefit (DI 198, p. 13) and is consistent with the record
evidence.
D.

The Public Interest is Served by Giving Customers the Option to Have
an Expanded Local Calling Area

Western Wireless challenges the Commission's failure to find public interest
benefits as a result of Western Wireless providing services and features currently
unavailable to consumers from ILECs. The evidence is undisputed that 1) Western
Wireless will offer the services, 2) the services are not currently available in universal
service offerings of the ILECs, and 3) some consumers will value and benefit from these
services. The Commission's failure to recognize these benefits as weighing in favor of
the public interest is without substantial evidence in the record and arbitrary and
capricious.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The first feature or service that Western Wireless will provide that is currently
unavailable is a larger, or expanded, local calling area. It is undisputed that Western
Wireless will offer consumers a local calling area larger than the ILEC's. DI 223, p. 16;
DI 220, p. 13. This would allow consumers in rural areas to be charged for fewer toll
calls. DI 223, p. 22. Western Wireless testified that this expanded local calling area is a
principle aspect of its service package, and that in every case, Western Wireless1
universal service customers will have this benefit. DI 220, p. 162; DI 221, pp. 336-37.
The Commission's Order specifically recognized this larger local calling area in its
discussion of Western Wireless1 ETC designation in the areas served by Qwest:
The Commission is relying on Western Wireless' testimony that the free
local calling area in every area served will be as large, or larger, than the
local calling area currently provided by [Qwest] in the exchanges in its
signal coverage area if it is granted state level approval.
DI 198, p. 14. The Commission did not explain its failure to consider this benefit of
Western Wireless' service offering in its public interest analysis for the rural telephone
company areas.
The evidence is undisputed that some consumers will find this new service option
beneficial.

Western Wireless explained that due to the nature of rural areas, some

consumers' calls to businesses, doctors, government offices or the like are currently toll
calls. DI 223, p. 22. An expanded local calling area will give consumers more freedom
to make these important calls. IdL Western Wireless testified that when a similar offering
was made by the Company in Regent, North Dakota, customers "flocked" to the service
due to the expanded local calling area. DI 220, p. 14. In fact, the ILEC in that area
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responded by increasing its own local calling area, which was something not done before
a competitive offering was available. DI 221, pp. 334-35. DPU witness Compton also
agreed this expanded local calling area was a specific benefit of designating WWC as an
ETC. DI 222, pp. 622-23. CCS witness Bullock testified that a larger local calling area
would be "highly desired by many consumers." DI 222, pp. 519-20. There is no
evidence on the record to contradict this testimony that customers will benefit from an
expanded local calling area once Western Wireless is designated as an ETC.
The FCC recently designated Western Wireless as an ETC in rural telephone
company areas of Wyoming, and specifically found that its expanded local calling areas
are a customer benefit that serves the public interest:
We believe that rural consumers may benefit from expanded local calling
areas by making intrastate toll calls more affordable to those consumers.
Wyoming Order, H 21.
The Commission in its Order thus acknowledged this beneficial feature in Western
Wireless1 proposed offering and heard unanimous testimony that larger local calling areas
would provide benefits to some consumers.

Without explanation, however, the

Commission failed to make a finding as to these benefits or to consider Western Wireless1
expanded local calling areas in the public interest analysis. The failure to make these
findings is not supported by substantial evidence in the record and is arbitrary and
capricious. The Court should order that the Commission should have found that Western
Wireless1 expanded local calling area is a beneficial service feature that advances the
public interest.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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E.

The Public Interest is Served by Giving Customers a "Mobility"
Option in a Universal Service Package

The second feature or service that Western Wireless will make available for the
first time to universal service customers is a mobility component. Western Wireless
testified that its universal service customers will use a 3 watt "wireless access unit" to
make and receive calls rather than a conventional .5 watt cellular handset. DI 223, p. 14;
DI 220, p. 11. This larger unit allows for increased signal strength, but still provides the
user with the benefit of mobility, as the unit can be moved from a customer's premises
and has battery backup. DI 220, p. 91. No party challenged Western Wireless' evidence
that its universal service customers will have a mobility component, which is a feature
unavailable from a landline ILEC.
It is also undisputed that some consumers would find this new service to be a
beneficial service to have in a universal service package. Mr. Blundell testified that a
rural customer would be able to take the wireless access unit to the bam or down the road
and still remain connected to the network. DI 220, p. 91. CCS witness Bullock agreed
this is a beneficial service that some consumers will find valuable. DI 222, pp. 519-20.
There is no evidence on the record disputing Western Wireless' contention that some
consumers will be benefited by having access to a universal service package that provides
a mobility component.
The Commission erred in ignoring undisputed testimony that designating WWC as
an ETC would bring the benefit of a mobile universal service offering to Utah's rural
consumers. This lack of a finding is not supported by substantial evidence in the record
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and is arbitrary and capricious.

The Court should order that Western Wireless*

designation as an ETC will advance the public interest by providing this new service
option to rural consumers of universal service.
III.

THE COMMISSION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY
THAT THE STATE FUND WOULD INCREASE WITH AN ADDITIONAL
ETC IS CONTRARY TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The Commission's reasoning for denying Western Wireless federal ETC status in

the areas served by rural telephone companies is based entirely on its concerns that such
designation might increase the size of the State Fund. DI 198, pp. 12-13. In effect, the
Commission determined that because the State Fund might grow as a result of
competition, that it is not in the public interest to have any competition.

This

determination that the Utah State Fund is incompatible with competition violates the Act,
FCC mandates, directives of the Legislature, and the Commission's own rules. The Court
should determine that a potential impact on the State Fund cannot be a consideration in
the public interest analysis under 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2).
A.

The Commission's Public Interest Standard Is Contrary to FCC
Mandates

Since the Commission issued its Order, the FCC issued its Wyoming Order, which
for the first time identified public interest criteria to be applied in designating an
additional ETC. On the issue of adverse impact, the FCC ruled that the public interest
analysis was intended to protect consumers from the possibility that the incumbent carrier
could go out of business if made subject to competition. Wyoming Order, Tf 18. In Utah,
however, the Commission's funding rules for the State Fund make such a result
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impossible, which as a matter of law precludes any finding of adverse impact. In
addition, the FCCs public interest analysis shows the Commission was wrong to consider
a possible increase in the size of the State Fund to be contrary to the public interest under
federal law.
The Commission has created a State Fund funding mechanism that applies to rate
of return regulated companies (like the URTA companies) and competitive ETCs in those
areas. Utah Admin. Code § R746-360-9. Pursuant to that Rule, a rate of return regulated
ILEC is entitled to state universal service funding to make up the difference between its
total embedded costs plus statutory rate of return and its total revenues. Id. § (A)(1); DI
198, p. 12. This same per-line support available to the ILEC is also available to a
designated competitive ETC on a per-line basis. Utah Admin. Code § R746-360-9(A)(l).
The State Fund, then, eliminates any possibility that competition will hurt incumbent
carriers, much less put them out of business. Because the FCC has interpreted the public
interest analysis to address an adverse impact that is precluded by the operation of the
Commission's funding rules, there can be no finding of adverse impact resulting from
Western Wireless' ETC designation.
Consistent with the FCCs mandate in the Wyoming Order, the Commission's
finding of a possible adverse impact due to a possible increase in the size of the State
Fund violates the intent of Congress and must be set aside. Because the Commission's
rules operate to preclude the possible adverse impact recognized by the FCC, there can be
no adverse impact attributed to Western Wireless' ETC designation, and the Court should
find the public interest standard is met.
1261574v2
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B-

The Commission's Application of the Public Interest Standard Is
Inconsistent with the Goal of Competition

The Commission's funding rules for the State Fund guarantee ILECs a rate of
return. By ensuring specific market outcomes, these rules reduce any incentive for a rural
ILEC to be more efficient or succeed as a competitor.9 The Commission's Order,
however, determines that because competition could erode ILEC revenue, and the State
Fund must foot the bill for any ILEC revenue losses, competition does not advance the
public interest. DI 198, pp. 12-13. In effect, the Commission has speculated that it will
be less expensive to fund only rate of return regulated monopoly providers, and so
concluded that continued monopolies are in the public interest. Id.
Whether the Commission's Rule guaranteeing rural ILECs a rate of return is good
policy (or even consistent with 47 U.S.C. § 254 and Utah Code Ann. § 54-86-15(4)(c)) is
not the issue at bar. The issue is whether the Commission, having favored ILECs in its
funding rules, can use the public interest standard in Section 214(e)(2) of the Act to
ensure favoritism by insulating ILECs from competition. As discussed below, the answer
is clear that it cannot.

9

It is significant that the Legislature has determined that rate of return regulation is
disfavored because it fails to properly protect consumers:
The Legislature finds that:
(a) traditional rate of return regulation cannot guarantee that customers who do
not have the choice of alternative providers will be protected from the economic
responsibility for making up for an incumbent telephone corporation's competitive losses
or from providing for the recovery of past, regulated investments
Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-2.4.
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C.

The Application of the Commission's Public Interest Standard Violates
Federal Law

Federal law requires the Commission to implement federal and state universal
service support mechanisms in ways that accomplish universal service goals through
competition, are competitively neutral and have funding that is portable among
competitive providers.

Because the Commission's public interest determination is

inconsistent with competition, prefers incumbent monopolists over competitors, and does
not allow funding to be portable, it violates federal law and should be reversed.
As detailed above, the Act requires that universal service goals be accomplished
through competition. Supra, pp. 12-15. The Alenco Court has confirmed that both
competition and universal service must be achieved, and "one cannot be sacrificed in
favor of another."

Alenco, 201 F.3d 608, 615.

Contrary to this mandate, the

Commission's Order determines the public interest is served by funding only a single
carrier. DI198, pp. 12-13. This rationale must be rejected as a matter of federal law.
In addition, federal law requires competitive neutrality among carriers, and
portability of support. Supra, pp. 14-15. Contrary to these mandates, the Commission's
Order determines that all federal and state universal service funding in these areas should
go to the ILECs. DI 198, pp. 12-13. This prefers ILECs simply due to their status as
ILECs, which is not competitively neutral. The Alenco Court has called guaranteed
market outcomes and protection from competition for rural ILECs "the very antithesis of
the Act" and a "guarantee that conflicts with competition." Alenco, 201 F.3d 608, 622,
625. Further, by denying federal ETC designation to Western Wireless based on State

1261574v2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
^

Fund considerations, the Order does not allow federal funding to be portable because it
allows "government regulators [to determine] who shall compete for and deliver services
to customers." Alenco, 201 F.3d at 616.
The Commission's public interest analysis defeats the universal service purposes,
goals, and intent of Congress and the FCC. It thwarts competition in favor of continued
monopolies, it is not competitively neutral, and it prevents federal universal service
support from being distributed as intended by Congress and the FCC. It also burdens
federal universal service support mechanisms in violation of Section 254(f) by preventing
competitive markets and portable funding. Accordingly, the Commission's determination
that it is against the public interest to use federal funds to support competition in rural
areas is clearly contrary to the Act, the FCCs mandates, and the Alenco Court's analysis,
and it must be reversed.
D.

The Commission's Public Interest Rationale Violates State Law

In addition to violating federal law, the Commission's determination that
competition should be sacrificed to prevent a potential increase in the size of the State
Fund is plainly contrary to the universal service mandate imposed on the Commission by
the Utah Legislature. As a result, the Commission's public interest analysis must be
reversed.
The Utah Legislature could not have been more clear in requiring the Commission
to take actions that are consistent with federal law, promote competition, and make state
universal service support portable:
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(4)(c) The [Commission's universal service rules] shall . . . be consistent
with the Federal Telecommunications Act.
(5)

Operation of the fund shall be nondiscriminatory and competitively
and technologically neutral in the collection and distribution of
funds, neither providing a competitive advantage for, nor imposing a
competitive disadvantage upon, any telecommunications provider in
the state.
* * *

(7)

To the extent not funded by a federal universal service fund or other
federal jurisdictional revenues or by the fund established pursuant to
Section 54-8b-12, the fund shall be used to defray the costs, as
determined
by the
commission,
of any
qualifying
telecommunications corporation....

(8)

The fund shall be portable among qualifying telecommunications
corporations.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-15 (emphasis added). There is nothing in these mandates that
directs the Commission to minimize the size of the State Fund by discouraging
competition. Thus, the Commission's public interest rationale violates state law by being
inconsistent with the Act, discriminatory, competitively and technologically biased by
providing a competitive advantage to the incumbent, and by preventing funding from
being portable.
E.

The Commission's Action is Subject to Reversal

For the above reasons, the Commission's conclusion that a potential increase in the
size of the State Fund caused by competition mitigates against the public interest must be
reversed on several grounds. This determination should be reversed as an error of law in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) because it misinterprets the public
interest in Section 214(e)(2) of the Act, and is contrary to the Commission's mandate to
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implement competitive universal service mechanisms. This action is also reversible as
unconstitutional under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(a) because it thwarts federallymandated universal service requirements resulting in action that is preempted by federal
law, and thus unconstitutional. Further, by exceeding its authority to implement the
universal service provisions of the Act, the Commission took action beyond its
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(b). For these reasons, all of which are
errors of law reviewed de novo by this Court (supra p. 2), the Commission's public
interest determination should be reversed.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COMMISSION'S ORDER
REQUIRING WESTERN WIRELESS TO PRICE AT OR BELOW
QWESTfS RATES
The Commission's Order mandates that Western Wireless charge "no more than

the Affordable Base Rate" for its state universal service offering to be eligible for
reimbursement from the State Fund in areas served by Qwest. DI 198, p. 14. The basis
for this is Commission Rule R746-360-7(B), which conditions receipt of state universal
service funding on pricing that is not "in excess of the Commission determined
Affordable Base Rate for basic telecommunications service." Utah Admin. Code §
R746-360-7(B). Commission Rule R746-360-2(A) defines the Affordable Base Rate,
and provides that the "Affordable Base Rate shall be established by the Commission."
Utah Admin. Code § R746-360-2(A). The Commission's Order acknowledges it has not
established an Affordable Base Rate, and so it instead "presumes" the "affordable" rate is
the rate currently charged by Qwest, the ILEC in Western Wireless1 designated exchange
areas. DI 198, p. 14.
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This price cap requirement imposed by the Commission must be reversed for two
reasons. First, the Commission's Rule establishing a rate cap for State Fund eligibility is
preempted rate regulation as applied to a CMRS provider like Western Wireless. Second,
if it is enforceable, the Commission erred by ordering WWC to price at Qwest's retail
rates, rather than the Affordable Base Rate to be established by the Commission through
a lawful rulemaking proceeding.
A.

Conditioning Eligibility for State ETC Funding to a CMRS Provider
on Specific Pricing Levels Violates 47 U.S.C. $ 332(c)(3)(A)

The imposition of a rate cap on a CMRS provider's eligibility for universal service
funding is preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A), and the Court should determine that
Western Wireless* retail rates do not need to meet this standard.
Section 332(c)(3)(A) of the Act provides, in relevant part:

M

[N]o State or local

government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged by a
commercial mobile radio service . . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A). While there are
limited exceptions to this prohibition, a state must file a petition with the FCC to be
granted regulatory authority under one of these exceptions, which has not been done in
Utah.

See 47 C.F.R. § 20.13 (2000). Consistent with this preemption, the Utah

Legislature has excluded CMRS providers from the definition of "telephone corporation"
(Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(22)(b)(i)), so that the Commission's rules on entry, rates, and
provision of local service do not apply to CMRS offerings. Utah Admin. Code §§ R746320, R746-340, R746-349.
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Absent the universal service provisions of the Act, then, Section 332(c)(3)(A)
unquestionably prevents a state from '"prescribing, setting or fixing rates1 of wireless
service providers." Cellular Telecomms. Indus. Assoc, v. F.C.C., 168 F.3d 1332, 1336
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing 13 F.C.C.R. 1735, 1745). See also Bastien v. AT&T Wireless
Servs., Inc., 205 F.3d 983, 986-87 (7th Cir. 2000) ("There can be no doubt that Congress
intended complete preemption when it said fno state or local government shall have any
authority to regulate the entry or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service.1").
The question for this Court, then, is whether a state's authority to create state universal
service mechanisms overcomes Section 332(c)(3)(A) preemption and allows the state to
impose an otherwise unlawful rate cap. A review of the applicable law makes clear that
Congress gave the state no such right.
First, the Act specifically provides that "Nothing in this section shall affect the
application of Section 332(c)(3) of this title to commercial mobile service providers." 47
U.S.C. § 253(e). Therefore, nothing in the universal service provisions of the Act can be
read to give the FCC or states the authority to overcome state rate and entry preemption
of a CMRS provider. The FCC agrees that "[t]he treatment granted to certain wireless
carriers under Section 332(c)(3)(A) does not allow states to deny wireless carriers [ETC]
status." Universal Service Order, ^ 145.
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has specifically held that the
universal service provisions of the Act must not be read to overcome Section
332(c)(3)(A). In Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. F.C.C., the Court ruled that
states could require CMRS providers to contribute to state universal service funds
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notwithstanding Section 332(c)(3)(A).

The Court found states could impose such

assessments because taxing a CMRS provider did not constitute setting a retail rate. Id.
at 332. In its discussion, however, the Court stressed that this interpretation was vital to
its ruling because it would not - and could not - interpret any portion of the Act to
overcome the preemptive effect of Section 332(c)(3)(A). Texas OPUC 183 F.3d at 431.
The Court based this on "Congress's instruction that § 254 be construed in ways that do
not conflict with other federal laws," and in particular Section 332(c)(3)(a), and cautioned
that this must be respected. Texas OPUC 183 F.3d 431,433 (citing Section 601(c) of the
Act, reprinted in 47 U.S.C. § 152 (Addendum A-l)).
Finally, one of the exceptions to Section 332(c)(3)(A) allows states to regulate
CMRS providers as "necessary to ensure the universal availability of telecommunications
service at affordable rates" if and only if CMRS as a whole is determined to be a
"substitute for land line telephone exchange service for a substantial portion of the
communications within such State." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A). The FCC and the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia have read that exception to relate to state attempts to
regulate rates of CMRS providers that are also ETCs, and have held that such rate
regulation must be preceded by the appropriate "substitutability" finding. This issue was
reached in Cellular Telecommunications Indus. Assoc, v. F.C.C., 168 F.3d 1332 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), another case related to a state's ability to levy universal service assessments
on CMRS providers. In attempting to craft a proper reading of Section 332(c)(3)(A) in
conjunction with Section 254(f), the Court recognized the FCCs view that the
substitutability exception "represents an exception for state laws that frame their
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universal service requirement in terms of a regulation of rates and meet the specified
[substitutability] condition." Id. at 1336. After analysis, the Court adopted this reading
because it gives meaning to each sentence and "fairly reflects the statute's purpose to
limit state rate and entry but not universal service regulation." Id at 1336-37. As
determined by the FCC and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, then, CMRS rate
regulation in a state universal service program is permissible only when a substitutability
determination has been made, which unquestionably has not been done here.
The conclusion is inescapable. Section 332(c)(3)(A) prohibits rate regulation of a
CMRS provider, and the substitutability exception must first be met to allow such rate
regulation within the context of a state universal service program. Any authority the state
has to implement state universal programs comes from Section 254(f), which, consistent
with Section 332(c)(3)(A), does not authorize rate regulation of a CMRS provider.
Instead, Congress has directed that Section 254(f) cannot overcome Section 332(c)(3)(A).
As a result, the Commission's imposition of a rate cap on Western Wireless1 universal
service offerings violates Section 332(c)(3)(A), and is thus reversible as an error of law,
as unconstitutional, and as beyond the Commission's jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-16(4)(a),(b)and(d).
B.

By Establishing an Affordable Rate Based on The Incumbent's
Charges, the Commission Has Engaged in Unlawful Rulemaking

If the Commission's Rule requiring pricing at the Affordable Base Rate is
enforceable as to Western Wireless, the Commission erred by ordering Western Wireless
to price at Qwest's current retail rates. Instead, the Commission should have ordered
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pricing at the Affordable Base Rate once such a rate is lawfully determined. The failure
to do so is an error of law and constitutes unlawful rulemaking, and must be reversed.
The Commission's Order can be rejected very simply as a misapplication of the
existing rule. While Rule R746-360-7(B) requires pricing of a universal service offering
at the Affordable Base Rate, the Commission ordered Western Wireless' pricing at a
different rate. DI 198, p. 14. This is not a fair or reasonable application of the rule, and
thus should be reversed.
The Order should also be reversed because the Commission sua sponte decided
that existing ILEC rates (which are not a part of the record) constitute the Affordable
Base Rate referred to in the rule. DI 198, p. 14. Determining an Affordable Base Rate
that will apply to ETCs serving customers throughout the state is a substantial
undertaking. An affordability determination presumably must look at services to be
provided, consumers' willingness and ability to pay for service, and the carrier's costs of
providing service, and will require the Commission to make significant policy decisions.
Moreover, how the Affordable Base Rate is set will impact the State Fund, which will be
used to bring rates down to that Affordable Base Rate. Utah Admin. Code § R746-3608(A).
Pursuant to the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act ("ARA"), Utah Code Ann.
Ch. 63-46a, an agency must follow rulemaking procedures whenever it changes the law
in a way that is generally applicable to a class of persons. Utah courts have rejected
agency attempts to bind parties with unlawfully created rules. Under Utah law, a "rule" is
defined generally as an agency's written statement that has the effect of law, implements
1261574v2
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or interprets a state or federal legal mandate, and applies to a class of persons generally.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2(16). Before a rule can be effective, the agency must engage
in formal rulemaking, which includes notice to interested parties and an opportunity to
comment. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3.
This Court has adopted a test to determine whether an agency order is void for
failure to engage in a formal rulemaking. In Williams v. Public Service Commission of
Utah, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986), the Commission, in contravention of prior practice and
policy, determined in an adjudicative proceeding that it was without jurisdiction over
one-way mobile telephone paging service. Id. at 775. Petitioners challenged this
determination as void for failure to conduct a formal rulemaking. Id.
The Court recognized that the pivotal issue was whether the Commission's
decision amounted to a "rule" under the ARA.10 Id. at 776. The Court determined that
agency action that was generally applicable, interpreted the law, and changed the law,
would meet the definition of a "rule" and would require a rulemaking under the ARA. Id.
at 776-77. Because the Commission had changed its regulation of one-way mobile
paging carriers in a way that affected all paging carriers, its determination in the
adjudicative proceeding was void, and could only be accomplished by formal rule. Id
As the Court explained:
[T]he November adjudicative hearing certainly cannot be considered an
adequate substitute for a rule making proceeding. Many of the protections
10

Although Williams was decided under the predecessor to the ARA, the Court noted
that the result would have been the same under either statute. Id. at 775 n.7. See also
C.P. v. Utah Office of Crime Victims' Reparations. 966 P.2d 1226, 1230 n.5 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998).
n£U1y(«1
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provided for by the Act were missing from that proceeding, including
adequate advance notices to all affected parties, an opportunity to
participate, and an opportunity to comment on the proposed rule . . . .
Because the requirements of the Act are not satisfied, the rule is vacated
and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
Id. at 777 (citations omitted). A similar result was reached in C.P. v. Utah Office of
Crime Victims' Reparations, where the Utah Court of Appeals rejected an agency
determination that required applicants for reparations benefits to use any available
Medicaid benefits before making application with that office. 966 P.2d 1226, 1229-30 '
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). The agency's conditioning of benefits on compliance with a
generally applicable requirement not found in the applicable rule was unlawful, and
rejected by the court. Id. at 1231.
Here, the Commission's own rules refer to an Affordable Base Rate that will be
generally applicable, is to be determined by the Commission, but has not yet been
established. Utah Admin. Code § R746-360-2(A). Nevertheless, in this adjudicative
proceeding the Commission has acted to set that Affordable Base Rate.

The

Commission's determination applies to all ETCs and prospective ETCs, and represents a
clear change in the existing law.

This determination is an unlawful rule, and (if

enforceable at all) must be reversed until such time as the Commission establishes an
Affordable Base Rate in accordance with law.
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CONCLUSION
The Commission has misapplied federal and state law and is attempting to prevent
universal service competition that consumers are entitled to have in rural areas. For the
reasons set forth herein, Western Wireless respectfully asks the Court to:
1)

identify the undisputed benefits of designating Western Wireless as an
ETC;

2)

reject possible impacts on the size of the State Fund as a factor weighing
against the public interest in Section 214(e)(2) of the Act;

3)

based on the above, find the benefits of designating Western Wireless as an
ETC outweigh any detriments, and that the designation of Western
Wireless as an ETC in the areas served by the URTA companies is in the
public interest; and

4)

order that any price cap for receipt of support from the State Fund is
unenforceable as to Western Wireless, or in the alternative, order the
Commission to establish an Affordable Base Rate by rule in accordance
with applicable rulemaking procedures.
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